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OBSERVATIONS ON THE PROBLEM OF 
“TOO BIG TO FAIL/SAVE/RESOLVE”
jan kregel
The current approach to the financial crisis has been to resolve small- and medium-size banks
through the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), while banks that are considered too
large to fail are given direct and indirect government support. Many of these large government-
supported banks have been allowed to absorb smaller banks through FDIC resolution, creating
even larger banks. As these banks repay their direct government support, the problem of “too big
to fail” is simply aggravated. The current thrust of government regulatory reform—increased cap-
ital and liquidity requirements, and further legislation—aims to make these large banks as safe as
possible or to allow dissolution through insolvency without creating system disruption. 
However, there are (at least) three separate problems associated with bank size that suggest
such reform may not reduce the systemic risks of large financial institutions that contributed to
the current crisis.
The Brandeis Problem
Multifunctional banking leads to a conflict of interest that produces fraudulent, anticompetitive
behavior. This has nothing to do with the absolute size of the institution or its interconnectedness
with other institutions; rather, it has to do with inherent conflict of interest in serving the fiduciary
interests of different clients. Louis D. Brandeis argued that a system that allows financial institutionsto combine “the four distinct functions of banks (commercial
banking, trust and insurance, corporate underwriting, and bro-
kering)” (Brandeis 1914, 5–6) would not be conducive to mar-
ket competition that serves the best interests of clients. He
asked: “Can there be real bargaining where the same man is on
both sides of the trade? The investment banker, through his
controlling influence on the Board of Directors, decides that the
corporation shall issue and sell the securities, decides the price at
which it shall sell them, and decides that it shall sell the securities
to himself” (11). 
Brandeis also noted that investment bankers’ control of
bank and trust company deposits was essential to their securing
“large profits from promotions, under-writings and securities
purchases,” which “led to a revolutionary change in the conduct
of our leading banking institutions … [and] a departure from
the legitimate sphere of the banking business, which is the mak-
ing of temporary loans to business concerns” (Brandeis 1914,
26). If banks no longer provide financing to the real productive
sector of the economy, the basic reason is that profits are higher
in capital market and trading activities allowed by multifunc-
tional banking.
This argues in favor of limiting the scope of financial insti-
tutions, irrespective of size. Even China cannot provide walls
sufficient to prevent osmosis across banking functions.
The Market Concentration Problem
Bank concentration reduces the ability of market competition
to ensure efficiency in providing banking services and allocat-
ing credit. In the regulatory sphere this is an antitrust problem
concerning absolute size and market control. The size of U.S.
financial institutions has been limited by the precedence of state
branching restrictions, the Bank Holding Company Act (1956),
and limits on the deposit share of acquiring banks (10 percent)
specified in the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching
Efficiency Act (1994), which, paradoxically, encouraged merg-
ers by authorizing interstate branching. Some states still main-
tain (somewhat higher) deposit caps. However, exemptions to
the federal deposit cap have been routinely granted during the
recent crisis. 
The monopoly over deposits granted by the 1933 Banking
Act to insured commercial banks has led to antitrust legislation
based on identifying the particular functions of a commercial
bank according to their dominance over defined geographical
areas. Even before the Financial Modernization Act (1999),
commercial banks’ main competitors were not one another but
noninsured providers of banking services. After the 1999 Act
allowed integration of diverse banking functions, it became
clear that this approach, or even the idea of a confined local
market, was no longer relevant. Finally, the drafters of the Bank
Holding Company Act were more interested in limiting the
intersection of banking and commerce than in limiting the con-
centration of banking functions and supporting competition.
Just as banking regulations have failed to keep up with the 1999
Act, antitrust legislation is equally ill adapted to deal with these
problems.1 Resolving the issue of bank size and concentration on
market competition will thus require new antitrust regulations.
This argues in favor of a revised antitrust approach to
assess the appropriate size of financial institutions, but does not
suggest that there is an absolute size limit.
The Interconnectedness Problem
This problem has to do with the ability of the regulatory agency
to rapidly resolve an institution that is exposed to a wide range
of unrelated financial institutions operating in different finan-
cial markets. There seems to be no necessary linkage between
large bank size or market concentration and interconnected-
ness. Rather, large size has been linked to synergy in providing
a variety of financial services within a single institution or hold-
ing company. Synergy and efficiency are presumed to justify
large size. There is thus a clear connection between multifunc-
tional financial institutions and interconnectedness both
within and across financial institutions. 
A related issue is the absence of formal resolution proce-
dures for noninsured, nonbank financial institutions, which are
excluded from the FDIC’s resolution process. On the one hand,
this is just a legal restriction created by the limited access to
deposit insurance, and can easily be remedied by legislation. Yet,
in order for it to be effective, it would have to be coordinated
across national regulatory jurisdictions, as demonstrated by the
problems created by the London subsidiary of Lehman Brothers.
On the other hand, the real problem is the size of the insur-
ance fund relative to the cost of resolving very large financial
institutions. This is the result of confusing the FDIC’s role as an
insurer of deposit liabilities held by the public and its role as a
provider of system stability in the event of bank failure. The lat-
ter role is not appropriate to the insurance-fund role of the FDIC. 
Policy Note, 2009/11 2The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 3
This argues in favor of limiting the scope of financial insti-
tution activities rather than seeking more efficient methods of
resolution and extending them to nonbank financial institutions.
The FDIC’s goal should be the stability of depositors’ claims, not
the stability of financial institutions or the financial system. 
In addition, there are a number of justifications for large
bank size that also need to be evaluated:
Banks have to be large in order to service the needs of large multi-
national corporations. The era in which big corporations kept a
special relationship with a sole investment bank came to an end
in the late 1970s. A watershed was the 1979 IBM bond issue,2 in
which co-lead underwriters were appointed in place of IBM’s
“sole” investment bank (Arenson 1979). Securities and Exchange
Commission Rule 415 allowing shelf registration for bond issues
further eroded the relationship investment banking model and
created a competitive market for investment banking and other
financial services. There is no evidence that U.S. multinational
firms have suffered because bank size was limited by regulatory
restrictions. However, they may be hampered by a lack of choice
due to bank concentration that has occurred recently. Indeed,
most investment banks were of relatively small size prior to their
incorporation as publicly quoted limited-liability companies.
The prohibition of fixed commissions in stock trading also
created new competitors for traditional broker-dealers that
produced substantial consolidation in the industry, but this was
clearly independent of the capital market and financial service
needs of large corporations. 
Banks have to be multifunctional to meet the complex needs of large
corporations.There is no evidence of synergy across financial serv-
ices (see below). Nor do large global companies rely on a single
bank for all their financial service needs; they often refer to local
banks to gain insight and presence in local conditions. Rather, it
seems more likely that banks operating globally have done so in
order to expand their foreign client base and to provide services to
businesses outside their local market.
Banks have to be big because they need a large capital base to pro-
vide the liquidity for successful primary issue of securities. It is
true that a bought deal requires the underwriter to commit cap-
ital, but large-scale deals arranged by individual banks no
longer appear to be standard practice. The IBM bond issue men-
tioned earlier was priced for distribution just before Paul
Volcker’s “Saturday night surprise,” in which he announced that
the Fed would follow restrictive moneysupply targets until infla-
tion was arrested. The rise in interest rates that ensued caused
substantial losses to most underwriters of the issue, with the
exception of one co-lead underwriter that (it was rumored)
hedged its position over the weekend. If an underwriter chooses
to assume risk by taking a position or guaranteeing an outcome,
then it is crucial that the underwriter has the ability to hedge
that risk rather than have sufficient capital to cover it. Indeed, the
size and liquidity of the capital market and the cost of hedging are
important, not the size of the capital that can be committed by the
underwriter.
The Global Competitiveness Problem
The original Basel process was a response to the globalization of
banking, as exemplified by the Herstatt bank failure in 1974 and
the fact that the capital of U.S. banks was inadequate relative to
the size of the bank’ losses in the Latin American debt crisis of
the 1980s. The process was also driven by the belief that the
risks of the banks’ derivatives business should be appropriately
priced and their exposure reported on the banks’ balance
sheets. The introduction of capital standards was also moti-
vated by the need to restore a level playing field globally. The
largest distortion to competition at that time was the ability of
Japanese banks (which were expanding their operations in the
London market) to operate with capital standards approxi-
mately half those of European and U.S. banks. The appreciating
yen exchange rate offered them another advantage (see
Solomon 1995, 415).
U.S. banks had expanded into global banking after the
credit crunch of 1965–66 in an attempt to escape Fed restrictions
on domestic expansion. They raised deposits in the London
eurodollar market and then engaged in other (U.S.-restricted)
capital-market activities such as underwriting eurobonds and
trading equities in London in order to avoid New York Stock
Exchange regulations on block trading—what came to be
known as the “London cross.” Thus, banks’ global expansion
and their increased size were more the result of extending oper-
ations into activities forbidden by U.S. regulators than attempt-
ing to compete globally. It was never a question of U.S. banks’
losing their domestic competitiveness in spite of the penetra-
tion of Japanese banks in the U.S. market. Rather, it was the
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been the major consideration in the 1980s,3 just as it was in last
year’s Treasury report on U.S. financial regulation (Department
of the Treasury 2008). 
But, the most important justification for large bank size is
that it provides the necessary returns to equity. The most per-
vasive argument in support of large size is so that banks gain
efficiency and produce competitive returns for shareholders.
Here there are also a number of different arguments that need
to be evaluated: 
The Financial Modernization Act (product diversification). The
argument here is that multifunctional banking diversifies risk
and earnings from various activities that stabilize income.
However, there is little evidence to support a low correlation
between activities that produce bank holding company earn-
ings. The recent improvement in some banks’ trading activities
seems to be due to increased spreads as a result of a lack of 
competition and the ability to substitute market funding with
zero-cost funding from the Federal Reserve. (Some critics have
suggested that allowing investment banks to operate as financial
holding companies with access to the Fed window is the equiv-
alent of creating government-backed hedge funds.)
The justification for multifunctional banking—that it pro-
vides synergies and thus cost savings and higher returns
through the banking equivalent of supermarkets—does not seem
to be borne out by institutions such as Citigroup that were cre-
ated on this basis. The idea of bank-insurance companies has
also gained some currency in European financial markets with-
out providing any positive evidence of either higher returns or
lower costs.
The Riegle-Neal Act (geographical diversification). The argument
is that large size through branching provides geographical
diversification of assets that reduces risk as well as the procycli-
cal provision of liquidity. However, there is little evidence of low
correlations of asset earnings across geographical regions, par-
ticularly in the United States. Indeed, one of the basic principles
of structured mortgage assets was the presumed low correlation
of house prices across geographical areas, which has clearly not
been confirmed. As Hyman P. Minsky pointed out, one of the
advantages of securitization was the ability to sell assets whose
purchase had been restricted to local markets to a global clien-
tele. This, of course, leads to a higher correlation across interna-
tional markets and a lower ability to reduce risk through global
diversification. The most important argument against this idea
is that (stock and asset) return correlations are strongly influ-
enced by market conditions and converge toward positive unity
in conditions of scarce liquidity—the precise condition under
which negative correlations are supposed to provide protection. 
Large size is necessary to gain the synergy from multifunctional
banking. Here the argument is that banks must be sufficiently
large to gain the competitive returns necessary to remunerate a
capital base that is sufficiently large to meet regulatory require-
ments and ensure stability. Large size supports the substantial
investments in information technology and research that are
required to produce financial innovations such as structured
securitization and to diversify globally. However, empirical 
evidence does not show any clear improvement in profitability
resulting from either economies of scale or scope. Rather, evi-
dence suggests banks are likely to experience scale economies 
up to an asset size of approximately $1 billion, followed by dis-
economies of scale thereafter (Shull and Hanweck 2001). Yet
large size does seem to allow for higher leverage levels, which may
temporarily increase profitability, but only at the cost of higher
risk. Moreover, there appears to be no clear evidence that large
size is required to produce financial innovations that lead to
higher returns. Indeed, the opposite may be true.
A decomposition of multifunctional banks would be too costly and
disruptive to the system. It is estimated that over $10 billion
(some estimates are as high as $23 billion) has been spent to
support the large financial institutions. This support has
allowed the number of financial institutions to decline and the
average size to increase without any appreciable benefits in pro-
viding financial services. While no estimates have been given of
the costs of decomposing multifunctional banks, the figure
would have to be in the range of $10 billion for the argument to
be credible.
Large Institutions or Large, Deep Markets
Much of the argument in favor of preserving large financial
institutions appears to mistake the benefits of large institutions
with the benefits of broad, deep markets. Broad markets are
conducive to both liquidity and stability, yet it is normally
argued that this result is achieved by having an ample number
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support for a large number of financial institutions is based on
the idea that a multitude of buyers and sellers with diverse
opinions is necessary in order to improve market efficiency in
price discovery and to provide market liquidity and stability.
Large size of financial institutions, however, does not contribute
to any of these outcomes.  
Conclusion
Financial market reform in 1997 provided the basis for both
large and multifunctional financial institutions. Clearly, that
legislation has not provided for either the stability of financial
markets or the implementation of what Brandeis called “the
legitimate sphere” of banking.
While Brandeis suggested that large size and multifunc-
tional banking are linked, there appears to be a basic difference
between the two. Past experience suggests that multifunctional
banking is the leading source of financial crisis, while large size
contributes to contagion and systemic risk. This suggests that
resolving large banks will not solve the problems associated
with multifunctional banking. This conclusion has been
reached following every financial crisis, and it should apply to
the present crisis as well. It is important to recognize that past
solutions may not be appropriate for present conditions. This
means that it will not be sufficient to apply prior solutions, such
as those proposed in the 1933 Banking Act, to reform the cur-
rent financial system. Rather, the challenge is to provide solu-
tions to the problems of multifunctional banking given the
financial innovations and changes in banking practices since
the beginning of deregulation in the 1970s. 
Notes
1.  The seminal banking antitrust case United States v.
Philadelphia National Bank(1963) applies the Sherman Act
of 1890 and the Clayton Act of 1914 to commercial banks.
The Supreme Court decision established “a long-standing
common law bank merger competition analysis, and intro-
duced to the banking antitrust competitive analysis key
analytical concepts such as ‘product or services market’ and
‘relevant geographical market,’ which became commonplace
in the evaluation of probable competitive effects of a pro-
posed merger. The seminal banking antitrust case contin-
ues to considerably influence the regulatory review para-
digm for bank merger analysis.
“The anticompetitive test … was designed to determine
whether the proposed bank merger might lessen competi-
tion in any line of commerce in any section of the country.
The Court defined ‘line of commerce’ as a cluster of prod-
ucts and services which banks specially provide to cus-
tomers, also referred to as ‘commercial banking.’ The Court
noted that ‘[i]ndividuals and corporations typically confer
the bulk of their patronage on banks in their local commu-
nity; they find it impractical to conduct their banking busi-
ness at a distance.’ Thus, the analysis created nearly [a]
half-century ago construed a section of the country, or rel-
evant geographic market, as being the local community of
the bank’s customers” (Pekarek and Huth 2008, 595).
2.    It was also the year of the first forex currency swap
(arranged by Salomon Brothers for IBM and the World
Bank), opening the way for global credit arbitrage and lay-
ing the groundwork for off-balance-sheet exposures and a
series of swaps instruments that culminated in credit
default swaps. See Mayer 1997, 281 ff.
3.   “If Glass-Steagall’s strictures remain unchanged, bankers
say, the U.S. financial community, with its millions of jobs,
could lose business to foreign financial hubs where con-
straints are fast disappearing.… With Japan liberalizing its
financial markets and Britain’s Big Bang creating new free-
dom to compete there, the U.S. can ill afford the rigidities
of Glass-Steagall. Money is nothing if not an international
commodity, and the business will go where the competi-
tion is freest” (Norton 1986). 
References
Arenson, K. W. 1979. “Can Morgan Stanley Cling to Sole
Managing?” The New York Times, October 8.
Brandeis, L. D. 1914. Other People’s Money, and How the
Bankers Use It. New York: F. A. Stokes.
Department of the Treasury. 2008. Blueprint for a Modernized
Financial Regulatory Structure. March.
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/Blueprint.pdf.
Mayer, M. 1997 The Bankers, The Next Generation, New York:
Truman Talley Books/Plume. Policy Note, 2009/11 6
Norton, R. E. 1986. “Unleashing Banks on Wall Street.”
Fortune, September 29.http://money.cnn.com/magazines/
fortune/fortune_archive/1986/09/29/68084/index.htm.
Pekarek, E., and M. Huth. 2008. “Bank Merger Reform Takes
an Extended Philadelphia National Bank Holiday.”
Fordham Journal of Corporate and Financial Law, Vol. 13,
no. 4: 595–703.
Shull, B., and G. A. Hanweck. 2001. Bank Mergers in a
Deregulated Environment: Promise and Peril. Westport,
Conn.: Quorum Books. 
Solomon, S. 1995. The Confidence Game: How Unelected
Central Bankers Are Governing the Changed Global
Economy. New York: Simon & Schuster. 
Recent Levy Institute Publications
POLICY NOTES




Fiscal Stimulus, Job Creation, and the Economy: What Are
the Lessons of the New Deal?
greg hannsgen and dimitri b. papadimitriou
2009/10
Banks Running Wild: The Subversion of Insurance by “Life
Settlements” and Credit Default Swaps
marshall auerback and l. randall wray
2009/9








The “Unintended Consequences” Game
martin shubik
2009/6
A Proposal for a Federal Employment Reserve Authority
martin shubik
2009/5
A Crisis in Coordination and Competence
martin shubik
2009/4
An Assessment of the Credit Crisis Solutions
elias karakitsos
2009/3
What Role for Central Banks in View of the Current Crisis?
philip arestis and elias karakitsos
2009/2
Obama’s Job Creation Promise: A Modest Proposal to
Guarantee That He Meets and Exceeds Expectations
pavlina r. tcherneva
2009/1